We study the pro…tability of horizontal mergers in nonrenewable resource industries, which account for a large proportion of merger activities worldwide. Each …rm owns a private stock of the resource and uses open-loop strategies when choosing its extraction path. We analytically show that even a small merger (merger of 2 …rms) is always pro…table when the resource stock owned by each …rm is small enough. In the case where pollution is generated by the industry's activity, we show that an environmental policy that increases the …rms'production cost or reduces their selling price can deter a merger. This speeds up the industry's extraction and thereby causes emissions to occur earlier than under a laissez-faire scenario.
Introduction
This paper examines the incentive to merge in nonrenewable resource industries. This sector constitutes a large proportion of GDP in many economies, 1 . 2 A …rst research question addressed in this paper is understanding why there is so much M&A activity in the exhaustible resource sector.
There exists a vast literature concerned with various aspects of horizontal mergers. Salant, Switzer & Reynolds (1983) , henceforth referred to as SSR, is arguably one of the most in ‡uential papers in that literature. SSR's important contribution is to show that horizontal mergers can be unpro…table, that is, the pro…ts of the merged entity is smaller than the sum of the pre-merger pro…ts of the individual …rms that merge. In particular, in the case of a symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal production cost where …rms compete in quantity, a merger of two …rms is never pro…table unless it is a merger to form a monopoly. Moreover, the merged entity must be signi…cant enough for the merger to be pro…table. The basic intuition driving this result is that, in the case of strategic 1 For example, exhaustible resource sectors, including oil, gas and minerals and mining, accounted for about 10% of Canadian GDP annually during 2008-2012, according to Statistics Canada. 2 The global value of M&A in the oil sector rose from $88.99 billion in 1997 (representing about 25% of global income from the oil sector in 1997) to $372 billion in 2007 (representing about 22% of global income from the oil sector in 2007) (see Kumar, 2012 , for further details). In Canada, for instance, exhaustible resource extraction industries have seen rising volumes of M&A in recent years. According to the data provided by the Canadian Competition Bureau, during 2012 to 2013, about 20% of the 330 mergers that were reviewed by the Bureau were in this sector, with 16% of mergers being realized in oil and gas extraction industries. The highest value merger transactions in Canada in 2012 were realized in the oil and gas extraction industry in the form of cross-border acquisitions, according to Macleans and Blake Canadian Lawyers, including the C$15-billion acquisition of Nexen by China's CNOOC and the C$5.5-billion acquisition of Progress Energy Resources by Malaysia's Petronas. substitutes such as in Cournot competition, when the merger participants decrease quantity, the non-merging …rms respond by increasing their output levels, thereby mitigating the increase in market power of the merger participants. The increase in output of the outsiders more than o¤sets the bene…t the merging …rms can get from their reduction of output. SSR's result has proven to be very robust to various modi…cations of the basic benchmark model (see, e.g., Stigler 1950; Kamien & Zang 1990 , 1993 Gaudet & Salant 1991; Farrell & Shapiro 1990 ).
The nonrenewable resource sector requires a speci…c merger analysis to account for the fact that the output of …rms, that is, their cumulative extraction over time, is limited by their stock. In that context, we investigate the pro…tability of mergers. We …nd that the result of SSR does not carry over to the case of nonrenewable resource industries: even a small merger (merger of 2 …rms) is always pro…table when the resource stock owned by each …rm is small enough. 3 We then analyze the impact, on the pro…tability of a merger, of an environmental policy that raises …rms'extraction costs (or reduces the price of the resource). This analysis is motivated by the fact that many important nonrenewable resources' production and/or consumption generate a negative externality (e.g., oil or phosphate). The impact of an environmental tax on the resource has received a lot of attention recently, as a carbon tax on fossil fuels is often viewed as a natural instrument to slow down global warming. An important stream of that literature examines whether a carbon tax may result in the Green Paradox, that is, the unintended consequence of speeding up fossil fuel extraction and therefore increasing pollution (see Sinn, 2008 , and, e.g., Pittel, van der Ploeg & Withagen, 2014, and Long, 2015).
Two papers that are closely related to ours are Benchekroun & Gaudet (2003) , which examines the impact of an exogenous marginal production restriction in a nonrenewable resource duopoly, and Benchekroun & Gaudet (2015) , which considers a renewable, common pool resource. In the case considered in this paper, the production restriction is non-marginal and is determined endogenously in equilibrium, each …rm owning a private stock of the nonrenewable resource. We …nd that a tax on extraction may prevent a merger from happening.
We show that a merger slows down the industry's extraction rate, and therefore delays emissions. If a higher tax rate deters a merger, it follows that emissions occur earlier under the stricter environmental policy than under a laissez-faire scenario. This result clearly carries a similar ‡avor to a green paradox. However, the channel of the increase in pollution, i.e., the merger decision of the players, is novel.
In instances where resource owners are countries and not …rms, coordination of interests among few resource owners is more likely to take the form of partial cartels rather than mergers. In the symmetric case where …rms have identical constant marginal costs, all the results derived in our paper naturally extend to the case of a cartel.
We use a dynamic game model where …rms compete in quantity in the output market while each …rm faces a resource constraint (the cumulative extraction over time must not exceed its initial endowment of the resource). We use a continuous time framework with an endogenous time horizon. We follow much of the existing literature on oligopoly models of We also generalize our results to the case of a marginal cost function that is decreasing in the remaining resource stock.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the analysis of the pro…tability of mergers. Section 4 analyzes the impact of a tax on extraction. Section 5 analyses the case where the marginal cost function is decreasing in the resource stock remaining. Section 6 concludes.
The Model and Preliminary Analysis

The Model
We consider an exhaustible resource industry involving n …rms. A number n S of these …rms initially each own a stock S 0S while n L …rms each initially own a stock S 0L ; with n L +n S = n.
Without loss of generality, we shall consider that S 0S S 0L and that the …rms with an initial endowment of S 0S are the …rst n S …rms, that is, S 0i = S 0S for i = 1; ::; n S and S 0i = S 0L for i = n S + 1; ::; n. Marginal extraction costs are constant and identical across all …rms, and given by c. Firms therefore may only di¤er with respect to their initial stock of the resource.
Let q i (t) 0 denote the extraction rate at time t 0 of …rm i.
to be the aggregate supply of the …rms initially endowed with a stock S 0S , and Q L (t) = n X i=n S +1 q i (t) to be the aggregate supply of the …rms initially endowed with a stock S 0L . Demand for the resource is stationary and linear with a choke price a > c, so that the inverse demand at time t 0 for the extracted resource is given by
. 6 An admissible extraction path q i (t) for …rm i is such that q i (t) 0 for all t 0 and
Firms are oligopolists in the resource market where they compete à la Cournot, and the 6 More precisely, p (t) = max fa bQ (t) ; 0g . Throughout the paper, we will focus on cases where the outcome is such that a bQ (t) > 0 for all t. This is true as long as the choke price a is large enough.
objective of a …rm i is to maximize the discounted sum of its pro…ts
Each …rm takes the extraction paths of its competitors as given and chooses an extraction path that maximizes its discounted sum of pro…ts (2), subject to the resource constraint (1).
We characterize an open-loop Nash-Cournot equilibrium (OLNE) of this game. More precisely:
A n-tuple vector of extraction paths q ( ) (q 1 ( ) ; : : : ; q n ( )) with q (t) 0 for all t 0
is an open-loop Nash-Cournot equilibrium if:
(i) the resource constraint is satis…ed for all i = 1; ::; n, and (ii) for all i = 1; : : : ; n we have
for allq i satisfying the resource constraint, where
Remark: note that by using the open-loop solution concept, we are assuming that …rms have the ability to commit to the whole extraction path at the beginning of the game.
A Nash equilibrium results in an outcome that is time-consistent. An alternative is to 
The Pre-Merger Equilibrium
We now proceed to characterize an OLNE of the above-de…ned game. We …rst show that all …rms exhaust their stocks in …nite time. Let T S and T L denote the time at which …rms with initial stocks S 0S and S 0L respectively exhaust their stocks. We will show that when
The equilibrium then consists of two phases: phase I from date 0 to T S , and phase II from T S to T L . During phase I, the extraction of both types of …rms is positive until T S where the extraction and the stock of …rms i = 1; ::; n S vanish. During phase II, only …rms i = n S + 1; ::; n still own a positive stock, until T L where the extraction and the stock of these remaining …rms vanish. We denote by q S and q L the extraction paths of …rms intially endowed with stocks S 0S and S 0L respectively.
where T S and T L are the unique solutions to:
Then the n-tuple vector q eq where q eq j = q S when j = 1; ::; n S and q eq k = q L when k = n S + 1; ::; n constitutes an OLNE.
Proof:
Each …rm i takes the supply paths of the other …rms as given and maximizes (2) subject to (1) . The current value Hamiltonian associated with the problem of …rm i is given by:
where (q i ; q i ) is an n-tuple vector obtained from the vector q by deleting its ith component and replacing it by q i .
Exploiting symmetry, the maximum principle yields the interior solution
for j = 1; ::; n S and k = n S + 1; ::; n, with
During the second phase where only …rms k = n S + 1; ::; n extract a positive quantity, the maximum principle yields:
The terminal times T S and T L are endogenous and determined by
for j = 1; ::; n S and
for k = 1 + n S ; ::; n. These last conditions along with the maximum principle imply that
Solving for (q j ; q k ) , from (7) and (8) , we obtain the following:
or
which yields
Therefore, by symmetry, we obtain the following:
From (9), (10), (12) and continuity of the costate variable k at T S , we have
The costate variables, j0 and k0 , are determined using conditions (13), along with (16) and (11). From (11) , we have:
that is,
From (16) , we have:
Using j0 and k0 and substituting (18) and (19) into (16), (17) and (11) yields (3) and (4) for t T S .
For t T S , we have a symmetric equilibrium among n L …rms that exhaust a stock during a time interval of length T L T S . We can therefore use the above analysis to obtain the equilibrium path.
The equilibrium paths (3) and (4) are determined as functions of the terminal times T L and T S . These dates are determined from the resource constraint conditions, i.e., (5) and (6) . It can be shown that such a non-linear system in (T L ; T S ) admits a unique solution,
We can now compute the value function of each player, which constitute a building block to conduct the analysis of the pro…tability of a merger. The equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts for an individual …rm of each type is given by:
and
for i = 1; ::; n S and j = n S + 1; ::; n. It will be useful to explicitly write the equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts as functions of (n S ; n L ; S 0S ; S 0L ). Substitution of q eq and integrating gives respectively V S (n S ; n L ; S 0S ; S 0L ) and V L (n S ; n L ; S 0S ; S 0L ) : The expressions of these functions for any (n S ; n L ; S 0S ; S 0L ) are too cumbersome to report here. Instead we report these value functions for two special cases that will be instrumental in the analysis of a horizontal merger in the following section. First, we have
where V S (n 1; 1; S 0 ; S 0 ) is the discounted sum of pro…ts of a single …rm in a symmetric n-…rm oligopoly, where all …rms initially own a stock S 0 . Second, we have
with
where V L (n m; 1; S 0 ; mS 0 ) represents, in an n m + 1 …rms asymmetric oligopoly, the value function of a single …rm that owns a stock mS 0 where m 2 f2; ::; ng while each of the remaining n m …rms owns a stock S 0 .
Note that the equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts, reported in (22) and (23) , are expressed in terms of terminal times, T in the case of (22) and T S and T L in the case of (23). The stocks do not appear in their expressions. However, the terminal times themselves depend on S 0 . The relationship between the terminal times T; T S and T L and the stock S 0 will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Pro…tability of Mergers
We exploit the characterization of the OLNE in the above-de…ned game to investigate the pro…tability of mergers of a subset of …rms in the industry. We …rst focus on the symmetric case, where all …rms have equal initial stocks, and provide an analytical proof that a merger is always pro…table when the stock of the resource is small enough. We then examine, through numerical simulations, the impact of a merger on the speed of extraction of the resource.
Finally, we investigate an asymmetric case, where the initial stock of merging …rms di¤er from the initial stock of an outsider.
Mergers in a symmetric oligopoly
We focus here on the case where the n …rms own the same initial stock S 0 S 0S = S 0L .
We consider a merger of a subset m of the n …rms. Since the marginal cost of extraction is constant, the market structure after a merger corresponds to asymmetric oligopoly competition between n m + 1 …rms, where the merged entity owns an initial stock equal to mS 0 while the n m outsiders each own an initial stock of S 0 . For simplicity, henceforth we set c = 0, which does not qualitatively a¤ect our results. The OLNE for the post merger oligopoly is readily obtained from Proposition 1 by setting n L = 1, S 0L = mS 0 , n S = n m and S 0S = S 0 .
A merger is pro…table when
From (5), it follows that the exhaustion time T in the pre-merger game is given by:
It is easy to show that, for a given S 0 ; this condition de…nes a unique T . We denote by T pre (S 0 ) the terminal time at which the stock is exhausted in the pre-merger game. It can be shown that T pre is a strictly increasing function of S 0 with T pre (0) = 0. For values of S 0 close to 0 we have the following Lemma.
where
is an expression such that lim
Proof: This follows from total di¤erentiation of (24) and using the second order Taylor series expansion of e rT around 0:
Remark 1: Lemma 1 allows us to establish that lim
and that lim
In the case of a merger, let T S and T L represent the times at which the n S outsider …rms and the n L merging …rms respectively exhaust their resources, so that T S and T L solve (5) and (6) . It can be shown that T S and T L are the solutions to the system of equations
Lemma 2: When S 0 ! 0, we have T S ! 0 and T L ! 0 with
and arT
3 are expressions such that lim
Proof: This follows from total di¤erentiation of (5), (6) and using the second order Taylor series expansion of e rT S and e rT L around 0:
Remark 2: Lemma 2 allows us to establish that lim
, which yield the following:
and, after simpli…cation,
In order to analyze the gain G from a merger when S 0 is close to 0; we …rst note that G can be expressed as a function of the dates of exhaustion of the stocks (T pre ; T S ; T L ) , and that a change in the stock S 0 a¤ects G through its impact on (T pre ; T S ; T L ). Note that when S 0 = 0, we have G = 0 and when S 0 ! 0, we have (T pre ; T S ; T L ) ! 0: We have the following lemmata:
Proof: This follows from total di¤erentiation of V S (n 1; 1; S 0 ; S 0 ) with respect to T pre and V L (n m; 1; S 0 ; mS 0 ) with respect to (T S ; T L ) and using the second order Taylor series expansion of e rT , e rT S and e rT L around 0:
We are now ready to determine the sign of the gains from a merger when S 0 is close to 0:
Proposition 2: For S 0 positive and su¢ ciently small, the pro…tability of a merger is always positive.
Proof: Using Lemma 3, we can write the gain from a merger, G V L (n m + 1; 1; mS 0 ; S 0 ) mV S (n 1; 1; S 0 ; S 0 ) when S 0 ! 0 as
which, using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, yields the following:
3 are expressions such that lim 
Mergers and resource extraction
In this section, we examine the extraction paths and exhaustion dates of …rms participating or not in a merger. As Figure 1 illustrates, T S < T pre < T L for any S 0 : When a merger occurs, the outsider …rm tends to extract from its resource stock faster than in the premerger scenario, whereas each of the merging …rms extracts the resource more slowly than in the premerger case. This is in line with standard oligopoly theory where, for strategic substitutes, a merger induces the merging …rms to reduce their output, which results in outsider …rms expanding theirs. The speci…city of a nonrenewable industry is that the overall cumulated extraction is a constant.
Our simulations indicate that a merger results in a slower extraction rate for the industry. This is illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots the total extraction by the industry at date 0 under a post-merger (Q post ) and a pre-merger (Q pre ) scenario as a function of the initial resource stock, using the same parameter values as in Figure 1 . Figure 2 illustrates that a merger results in an initial overall extraction rate that is lower than when there is no merger. Simulations using combinations of n; m with n 10 and m 2 f2; n 1g and various values for the parameters a; b and r show that this result is qualitatively robust: a merger results in a slower extraction rate for the industry at any resource stock level.
The case of an asymmetric oligopoly
We now use a numerical experiment to illustrate that Proposition 2 carries over when …rms have di¤erent initial endowments of the resource. Consider three …rms, two with an initial stock S 0L and one with an initial stock S 0S = f S 0L , where f 2 (0; 1]. Figure 3 illustrates, as a function of S 0L , the gains resulting from a merger of the two …rms with initial stock S 0L , using the same parameter values as in Figures 1 and 2 . In line with Proposition 2, Figure 3 shows that the merger is pro…table when the value of S 0L is su¢ ciently small. The following result is robust to changes in parameter values.
Result 1:
A given merger is more likely to be pro…table the smaller is the stock of the outsider and the larger are the stocks of the merger participants. Figure 3 , where the smaller is f , the greater is the range of S 0L
Result 1 is illustrated in
for which the merger is pro…table. This may explain why some of the largest …rms in the oil extraction sector have merged since the 1990's. This result is intuitive: we know that a merger of two …rms in a duopoly is always pro…table. The smaller the outsider …rm's stock relative to the stock of the merged …rms when two …rms merge, the closer the pro…t of the merged …rm to the pro…t of a merger of …rms in a duopoly. Therefore, a merger of two …rms in the case of a triopoly, when the outsider …rm's stock is small relative to the stock of the merged …rms, is more likely to be pro…table than when the outsider …rm's stock is large relative to the stock of the merged …rms.
Impact of a tax on extraction
Non renewable resource industries can be important sources of pollution. A natural policy instrument that is often considered is the imposition of a unit tax on the resource produced.
In this section, we examine the interplay of such policy on …rms'incentives to merge and, thus, on the industry's market structure.
More precisely, we examine the e¤ect of stricter environmental policies where, for simplicity, we assume that each unit extracted generates a unit of polluting emissions. The policy maker sets a constant tax per unit of extraction, . The objective function of a …rm i is then given by:
subject to the resource constraint. The OLNE and the pro…tability analysis can then be directly exploited by assuming that the marginal cost of extraction is increased by . Our numerical simulations yield the following result, which is robust to changes in the parameter values.
Result 2: A given merger is less likely to be pro…table the higher the emission tax. Figure 4 , where the higher is , the smaller is the range of S 0L
Result 2 is illustrated by
for which the merger is pro…table. An implication of Result 2 is that the emission of pollutants may be a¤ected in a perverse manner due to the imposition of a higher emission tax, resulting in a green paradox. Note that in Hotelling models in which the long-run cumulative extraction is not impacted by the tax, a constant unit tax induces markets to postpone the extraction of the resource. Indeed, a constant tax means that the present value of the tax decreases over time, encouraging markets to delay extraction, irrespective of the market structure. Thus, the …rst e¤ect of the tax policy under study is opposite to a green paradox. On the other hand, Result 2 indicates that a tax might deter a merger, which increases the speed of extraction. This is the second e¤ect, which drives the green paradox. In what follows, we illustrate that, when a merger is deterred due to a higher emission tax, the second e¤ect dominates within our context.
Indeed, as noted in Section 3.2, a merger results in a lower initial extraction rate of the resource than in the premerger scenario. If an increase in prevents a merger from being realized that would otherwise have occured, the path of emissions in equilibrium is altered, so that more emissions occur earlier than would have been the case with a lower tax level.
This is illustrated with the following example of a symmetric triopoly where we set again a = 0:8555, b = 0:8555 2 ; r = 0:1 and examine the impact of a unit tax = 0:05: Figure 5 plots the industry's initial extraction rate as a function of the stock in four cases: (i) symmetric triopoly (Q pre ) and = 0, (ii) symmetric triopoly and = 0:05, (iii) merger of 2 …rms among 3 (Q post ) and = 0 and (iv) merger of 2 …rms among 3 and = 0:05. We note again that, for both = 0 and = 0:05, a merger results in a decrease of the initial industry's extraction rate, for all initial stock levels.
To illustrate the implication of Result 2, we consider the case where S 0 = S 0L = S 0S = 7:5.
The gains from a merger when = 0 (resp. = 0:05) are 0:0154 (resp. 0:0006). That is, a merger is pro…table when = 0 and unpro…table when = 0:05. Comparing the extraction rates under case (ii) and case (iii), we …nd from Figure 5 that the industry's extraction rate are higher under case (ii) than under case (iii). Figure 6 plots the path of the industry's cumulative extraction rate under case (ii) and case (iii): when the pro…tability of a merger is taken into account, a tax of = 0:05 results in a faster depletion of the resource than the case of = 0. In cases where the damage from pollution, which we have not explicitly modeled in this paper, is convex in the emission level and/or where pollution is accumulative, the prevention of the merger due to a higher tax could ultimately adversely a¤ect the environment.
The case of economic exhaustion
Thus far, we have assumed the physical exhaustion of the resource. For some resources, the marginal extraction cost is a decreasing function of the level of the stock. In this case, it may happen that the extraction cost increases to levels that render the exploitation of the remaining stock unpro…table, so that some resource is left in the ground. We now revisit the pro…tability of a merger in an oligopolistic industry in this case.
Assume that the marginal cost of extraction from each mine 8 is given by:
where c 0 > 0 and c 1 > 0 are such that the choke price a < c 0 , which implies that a mine will be shut down when the stock reaches the level S c 0 a c 1 .
For comparison purposes, we limit our attention to the case of a symmetric triopoly where each …rm owns an initial stock S 0 , with S 0 > S. Let x S S, it is straightfoward to rewrite the discounted sum of pro…ts of …rm i = 1; 2; 3 as
Firm i maximizes (31) subject to
Proposition 3: Let
where 1 2 r p r(c 1 + r) < 0;
then the vector (q; q; q) constitutes an OLNE of the symmetric triopoly game.
Proof: See Appendix.
From Proposition 3, it follows that the equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts of a single …rm is given by:
We now consider a merger of 2 …rms. Since the marginal cost of extraction is no longer constant, we can no longer use the pre-merger equilibrium to deduce the post-merger equilibrium. Consider an industry that consists of two …rms, an outsider …rm that owns a single mine and a merged entity that owns two mines, mine 1 and mine 2. Let S S ( ), S L1 ( ) and S L2 ( ) respectively denote the stock path of the outsider …rm and of mine 1 and mine 2 of the merged entity with S S (0) = S 0S ; S L1 (0) = S 0L1 and S L2 (0) = S 0L2 . Denote by q S ( ) the extraction path of the outsider …rm and by q L1 ( ) and q L2 ( ) the extraction paths of the merged entity from mine 1 and mine 2 respectively. We drop the argument of the paths whenever the explicit reference to time is not necessary. While the outsider …rm chooses q S ;
the merged entity chooses a pair of extraction paths fq L1 ; q L2 g.
Proposition 4:
Suppose that S 0S = S 0L1 = S 0L2 = S 0 and let x 0 = S 0 S, then the vector (q o ; fq m ; q m g) where
and q m (t) = 1 6 ( (3 + 2 p 3) 1 e 1 t + ( 3 + 2 p 3) 3 e 3 t )x 0 (36)
constitutes an OLNE between the merged entity and the outsider …rm.
It is now straightforward, using Propositions 3 and 4, to compute the equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts for each …rm under both the pre-merger scenario and when a merger occurs, from which we can then infer the pro…tability of a merger. Let W ol (x 0 ) denote the equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts of a merged entity and V ol (x 0 ) denote the equilibrium discounted sum of pro…ts for the two …rms that merge under the pre-merger scenario, when all …rms own identical stocks x 0 . It can be shown that
and that 
Result 3: A merger of two …rms can be pro…table.
Result 3 is illustrated in Figure 7 using a numerical example, where we set r = 0:05; b = 1 and x 0 = 100, and plot the gains from a merger W ol (x 0 ) V ol (x 0 ) as a function of c 1 . 
Gains
, depend on the parameter c 1 . The maximum gain from a merger is approximately 0.3% of the total payo¤ when there is no merger. The larger is c 1 ; the more important is the role of the cost e¤ect in the …rm's payo¤s, and the less important is the market interaction between …rms.
In this case, the extraction and payo¤ of a …rm when a given merger occurs and when it does not occur are very close to each other. When c 1 is su¢ ciently small, then the market interaction is relatively more important than the stock e¤ect on costs, so that we retrieve the standard result from static oligopoly theory that a merger of two …rms is not pro…table. These qualitive results are robust to changes in the values of the parameters b and r.
Conclusion
This paper showed that, if resource stock levels are small enough, small mergers (mergers of two …rms) are pro…table under constant marginal costs and may also be pro…table when the marginal cost is decreasing in the resource stock level. The pro…tability of mergers arises because outsiders are limited in their response in terms of increased output due to their …nite resource stocks. Mergers allow the merger participants to raise prices more than in industries without stock constraints. Therefore, antitrust authorities should be cautious when ruling on mergers in non-renewable resource industries. At the same time, mergers in these industries reduce environmental damage by delaying extraction.
The interplay of environmental regulations and incentives to merge deliver interesting insights: an environmental tax can a¤ect merger pro…tability. In the case of a polluting resource, a unit tax on extraction may deter mergers and, therefore, may result in causing emissions earlier than under laissez-faire. A small increase of the tax may result in a nonmarginal jump upwards of the industry's pollution.
In our analysis, we ignored the possibility that a perfect substitute to the resource may exist. This simpli…es the analysis and, at the same time, allows to directly contrast our results with those obtained in the SSR framework. However, e.g. for fossil fuels, the existence of a backstop technology that can provide a substitute to the resource at a given …xed price, and that is supplied by a perfectly competitive market, has received a signi…cant amount of attention. In this case, the resource owner, e.g., OPEC, can resort to limit pricing: charging a price that is just enough to undercut the backstop substitute. Recent important contributions on limit pricing arising in fossil fuel extraction include Andrade de Sa and Daubane (2016) and Van der Meijden, Ryszka and Withagen (2018) 9 , or Salant (1977) and Hoel (1978 Hoel ( , 1984 for earlier contributions. A natural and relevant follow-up research question to our analysis is the pro…tability of a merger or of cartel formation 10 in the presence of a backstop substitute.
In that case, if, for example, initial endowments of the nonrenewable resource and/or demand elasticity are such that limit pricing takes place from the initial date until the extinction of the resource, then a merger may not a¤ect the price path of the resource 11 and a speci…c analysis of cartel or merger pro…tability is in order. This is left for future research. 9 Andrade de Sa and Daubane (2016) considers a nonrenewable resource monopoly facing a backstop substitute. They show that, when the price elasticity of demand is smaller than one, the monopolist choses, at each moment, a corner solution, i.e., induces the limit price which deters the backstop-substitute production. Van der Meijden, Ryszka and Withagen (2018) consider a non-renewable resource supplier who faces demand from two regions, one of which employs a tax on the imported resource and a subsidy on the available backstop technology, and one that has no environmental policy in place. They show that the resource extraction path possibly contains two limit pricing phases. 10 As noted above, in instances where resource owners are countries and not …rms, coordination of interests among the resource owners takes the form of cartels rather than mergers. 11 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing to this possibility.
Consider the symmetric triopoly game described by (31) (32) (33) , given extraction paths q 1 and q 2 of …rm 1 and …rm 2; the necessary conditions for a positive extraction q 3 of the third …rm are given by 
From (40) and (42), we obtain:
From (41) and (43) , it follows that the symmetric OLNE when …rms are identical is given 
Taking the time derivative of the conditions above yields
and, therefore, the other Maximum Principle conditions yield From ( 
with _ S S = q S (59) 
Solving the system of di¤erential equation (57) (60) with the conditions (61) (63)
yields (35) and (36) 
